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This paper examines the notion of the biopolitical body from the 
standpoint of Foucault’s logic of the security mechanism and the 
history he tells of vaccine technology. It then investigates how the 
increasing importance of the genetic code for determining the 
meaning and limits of the human in the field of 20th century cell 
biology has been a cause for ongoing transformation in the practices 
that currently extend vaccine research and development. I argue that 
these transformations mark the emergence of a new kind of medical 
subject – the stabilized and infinitely reproducible human cell line – 
and that the practices and markets exploiting this new form of 
organism have had a destabilizing effect on the very biopolitical 
structures that engendered them and, in fact, mark a new way of 
conceiving the possibilities of cellular life. I call these new ways of 
organizing power that intervene in the logic of the security measure 
by mediating the relationship between populations and persons the 
microbiopolitical. 
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I. Introduction: Biopolitics and the History of HeLa 
 
Between 1977 and 1979, Michel Foucault (1997; 
2004) delivered a series of lectures analyzing the 
development of strategies for intervening in the 
MICROBIOPOLITICS 
 107 
characteristics of populations. Over the course of these 
lectures he identifies in these techniques an approach to 
governance called biopolitics whose origins reside in the 
18
th
 century campaigns against contagions. Foucault 
identifies early vaccination campaigns as the first 
European dispositifs de sécurité (mechanisms of security) 
deployed to affect masses of people at the level of 
populations. The techniques of the early vaccination 
campaigns were bio-political in that, through them, the 
State for the first time directly assumed responsibility for 
the care of the biological life of its citizens as one of its 
principal tasks.  
Foucault’s analyses describe the first applications of 
vaccine technologies as a way of modifying the risk of 
contagion for whole populations. The efforts of 
virologists against polio in the 20
th
 century were 
supported when these technologies were further refined 
through developments in the field of cell culture research. 
Cell culture research had as one of its first objectives 
growing and organizing individual human cells into 
sustainable cell lines for testing and developing vaccines. 
One of the first cell lines to be successfully grown in 
culture was the HeLa cell line crucial to the development 
of the first polio vaccine. Rebecca Skloot’s (2010) book, 
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, tells the story of 
Henrietta Lacks, an African-American woman from 
Baltimore who died from cervical cancer when she was 
thirty and whose cancerous tissues served as the origin 
for this now ubiquitous Hela cell line. The history Skloot 
tells clearly shows that the peculiar properties of these 
cells were one of the principal causes for the spectacular 
growth and transformations that have occurred in the 
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fields of cell culture research and vaccinology from the 
1950s to the present.  
In this paper I read Skloot’s history of 20
th
 century 
vaccinology through Foucault’s analysis of the notion of 
vaccine technology as a security mechanism. I argue here 
that Skloot’s history, viewed through Foucault’s 
biopolitical framework, describes a period of recent 
transition between two notions of the medical subject 
from one based on disciplinary approaches to contagion 
to one informed by the power of specific security 
mechanisms – principally those of inoculation and 
vaccination; I also suggest that Skloot’s story describes 
the emergence of a new, third kind of medical research 
subject – post 1948 – one that exceeds the matrices of 
technico-practical power organizing 19
th
 century security 
mechanisms like vaccinology. I argue here that through 
contemporary advances in the field of cell biology a new 
kind of human ‘strain’ has emerged that currently 
parallels, counters, and even converges with our judicial, 
disciplinary and normalized selves. In its encounter with 
contemporary techno-economic structures, this new form 
of ambiguously human, manufactured life is one where 
new ways of organizing and sustaining biological life at 
the level of ‘bare life’ have emerged (Agamben, 1998, 6). 
I term the principles and practices structuring this new 
field of techno-economic inquiry the micro-biopolitical 
(Paxson, 2008; Latour, 1988). (1) In clarifying this 
argument, I first outline Foucault’s discussion of the 
emergence, meaning, and structure of inoculation and 
vaccination campaigns as security mechanisms targeted 
at the behavior and characteristics of populations. (2) I 
then read the history of the fields of cell culture research 
and vaccinology as told by Skloot and others through the 
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framework of the practical power of this security 
measure. (3) Finally, I indicate how the notion of genetic 
identity, in its convergence with market forces like the 
patenting regime, have begun to mediate disruptively the 
relationship of population to case, implicit to the logic of 
the security mechanism. 
 
II. Les dispositifs de sécurité: From Exile to 
Inoculation 
 
During the 1978 lectures Foucault describes how the 
response to contagion shifts from a disciplinary to a 
security approach in the transition between the Middle 
Ages and the 19
th
 century and how the medical 
techniques of inoculation and vaccination played a key 
role in forming the notion of population that emerged in 
the 18
th
 century. In these lectures, Foucault first explores 
the difference between two forms of governance, that is, 
1) the governance of subjects through disciplinary 
techniques and 2) governance as a set of strategies for 
intervening in the behavior of populations, which he 
terms the security mechanism. Thus, during the Middle 
Ages, the response to outbreaks of leprosy and the plague 
was very different from the way outbreaks of smallpox 
came to be handled in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
(Foucault, 2004, pp. 9-12 and Foucault, 1972, pp. 15-66). 
For Foucault the treatment of lepers during the Middle 
Ages exhibits a disciplinary approach in that the use of 
exclusion was a primary practical principle here. The 
techniques of exclusion and isolation of the diseased 
occurred through a regime of laws and regulations that 
relied on a sharp, binary division between those who 
were and those who were not lepers. The objective in the 
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treatment of leprosy was, “first of all to treat the disease 
in each patient, insofar as they could be cured, and then 
to prevent contagion by isolating the sick from the 
healthy” (Foucault, 2004, pp. 57-89). 
The measures developed to contain the spread of 
plague also involved a set of disciplinary regulations 
formulated during the Middle Ages. By the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries responses to outbreaks of plague imposed a 
partitioning grid on the affected regions and then 
determined: 
 
…when people can go out, how, at what times, what 
they must do at home, what type of food they must 
have, prohibiting certain types of contact, requiring 
them to present themselves to inspectors, and to 
open their homes to inspectors (Foucault, 2004, 11-
13).  
 
Despite being deployed differently, each of these 
disciplinary approaches – exclusion and partitioning – 
proceed according to similar principles (Elden, 2003). 
Their objective was to eliminate the disease in each 
affected person and to prevent spread by isolating 
affected individuals, putting physical space between them 
and the healthy. 
 
III. Populations and Vaccination 
 
However, Foucault describes the emergence of the 
security measure as a new form of governance that 
appeared in the field of health care as a new way of 
responding to outbreaks of smallpox in the 18
th
 century. 
In the case of smallpox, medical practices had already 
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shifted away from the kinds of problems involved with 
the separation and containment of diseased individuals. 
In Foucault’s (2004) estimation, the central problem here 
had become that of knowing the population: 
 
…how many people are infected with smallpox, at 
what age, with what effects and with what mortality 
rate, lesions or after-effects, the risks of inoculation, 
the probability of an individual dying or being 
infected by smallpox despite inoculation, and the 
statistical effects on the population in general. (pp. 
47-48)
 
 
 
These early campaigns of inoculation and 
vaccination did not suspend use of the disciplinary 
techniques developed in the fight against leprosy and the 
plague; they shifted the focus of those techniques from 
individuals to populations. Still, Foucault (2004, p. 12) 
argues that the earliest uses of vaccine technology cannot 
be explained away as simple adaptations of existing 
frameworks. They marked a genuinely new approach to 
the phenomenon of disease, a new approach he calls the 
security measure (Foucault, 1997, pp. 214-216). 
So what then is the security measure in the context 
of vaccine technology? Foucault (2004) relates how, in 
Western Europe during the 18
th
 century, smallpox was an 
endemic disease affecting 2/3 of children with a mortality 
rate of nearly 1 in 8. Further, outbreaks were frequent. 
London at the start of the 18
th
 century experienced an 
outbreak every five or six years. At that time, inoculation 
and vaccination were new techniques, Lady Mary 
Montagu having only just brought the practice of 
inoculation back from Turkey to England in 1727 
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(Maitland, 1872). As ways of responding to contagion, 
these new measures exhibited three characteristics: The 
first difference was an understanding, implicit to the 
techniques themselves, of being capable of being 
generalized to everyone without great material or 
economic difficulties. Through these measures, the 
collectivity as a whole could be protected from 
contagion. Second, unlike many medical strategies during 
this time, these techniques were certain of attaining their 
objective in that their deployment absolutely prevented 
the occurrence of an outbreak and made it possible to 
consider the real possibility of one day eradicating it 
entirely (Foucault, 2004, pp. 59-60 and Plotkin, 2008, 1-
16).  
Thus, the certainty of the treatment’s success and the 
prospect it held for one day entirely eliminating smallpox 
epidemics made these mechanisms acceptable despite the 
fact that they had the unusual additional third feature of 
being unthinkable in terms of the medical consensus of 
the time (Plotkin, 2008, p. 2). These techniques were 
deployed entirely on the basis of their practical, empirical 
success and despite the fact that the medical community 
of the time could not account for this success and was 
often hostile to adoption of these practices (Durbach, 
2000, pp. 45-62; Plotkin, 2008, p. 6; Williamson, 1984, 
pp. 1195-1196; Wolf, Sharp, 2002, 430-432). For 
Foucault (2004, pp. 107-109), vaccine technologies were 
integrated into existing medical practices not because 
they were backed by existing medical authorities but 
because inoculation and vaccination as techniques had 
much in common with other newly emerging security 
measures that were being deployed and taking root at that 
time.  
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Disciplinary regulations were established ways of 
responding to epidemic outbreaks like the plague or to 
endemic diseases like leprosy. These measures aimed to 
treat the occurrence of the disease in each individual 
patient and then to prevent contagion through isolating 
the sick from the healthy. On the other hand, inoculation 
and vaccination did not make separation and isolation 
their objectives. Rather, these measures took the sick and 
the healthy as a whole, conceiving their subject for the 
first time to be, specifically, a population. The newly 
emerging field of statistics would be crucial to the 
political acceptance of vaccination as an effective 
technique for responding to disease at the level of 
populations, with statistical analysis and measurement 
becoming the new modes for publicly presenting medical 
rationality (Foucault, 2004, pp. 107-109). What it meant 
to know ‘the normal expectation in the population of 
being affected by the disease and of death linked to the 
disease’ depended entirely on this fact being statistically 
expressed (Foucault, 2004, p. 59). Thus, the very first 
instances of the use of statistics in medical practice occur 
in this context and determined, for example, that the rate 
of mortality from smallpox in 19
th
 century London was 
roughly 1 in 7.782. The fact that the threat posed by 
disease could be statistically expressed established the 
normal mortality for the population taken as a whole.  
With finer and finer statistical analyses it became 
possible to tease out other “normalities” having a 
relationship to one another and to the whole. Thus, for 
the first time one could know the rates of infections and 
mortalities for different ages, different regions, different 
occupations, different zones of habitation (i.e., town 
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versus country), and even for different neighborhoods 
within towns. Knowing this range of variations made it 
possible both to target those groups most unfavorably 
affected and to employ policies to bring them more into 
line with the overall normal levels of morbidity and 
mortality for the entire population. If there existed a high 
level of morbidity in children under 3 years of age living 
in towns in the neighborhoods close to a river, then 
specific measures went into effect to reduce the 
occurrence of smallpox within that carefully defined 
group.  
Because those statistical outliers were dynamically 
related to the average rates of morbidity and mortality for 
the whole population, bringing them more in line would 
then register an immediate change in the average. Thus, 
as security mechanisms, the practices of inoculation and 
vaccination no longer relied on a sharp separation drawn 
between normal and abnormal, the healthy and the 
diseased, so essential to disciplinary responses to 
contagion. Unlike those techniques, security measures 
were organized to bring about an operation of 
normalization for the whole population that would 
increasingly lead all the distinct groups within it to reflect 
the normal trend-line. (Foucault, 2004, pp. 57-60). 
Unsurprisingly, for mechanisms of security the 
details – i.e., the specific characteristics being examined 
in the population – were considered neither good nor bad 
in themselves. In fact for the successful functioning of 
security measures it was considered all-important to 
allow the noteworthy variations within the population 
simply to show themselves and ‘to let things happen.’ 
Further, these variations were not to be eliminated nor 
directly targeted. Rather, implicit to the logic of these 
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new measures was the understanding that characteristics 
of the population could be changed by indirectly 
affecting those who composed it. Thus it clearly followed 
that vaccinating someone against smallpox did not treat 
their infection when the disease had already presented 
itself any more than getting a preventative flu shot is 
useful when someone is already suffering from fever and 
nausea. As a security measure, the vaccination campaign 
was understood to support and strengthen over time the 
most favorable normality without directly targeting or 
otherwise separating out diseased individuals within the 
population.  
 
IV. Populations and the Individual – The Medical 
Case 
 
So what then happens to the status of the individual 
person in this shift between disciplinary and security 
related techniques? In disciplinary techniques, affected 
individuals are conceived relative to the sharp divide 
drawn between normal and abnormal. For Foucault, one 
can still speak and think meaningfully in this context of 
an individual person who has been affected and requires 
direct treatment. Though the person afflicted with leprosy 
or the plague do, strictly speaking, fall within the 
category of abnormality it is through this categorical 
determination that the person in question is singled out 
from others, i.e., the healthy, for precisely individual 
treatment. On the other hand, what does it mean to be an 
individual within the framework of the security measure? 
As a possible entry point for and bearer of contagion, the 
individual becomes a fractional contributor to the 
statistical coefficients determining the morbidity and 
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mortality of the occurrence of the contagion in the 
population taken as a whole. However, the logic of the 
security measure as security measure only considers the 
characteristics of populations. Security mechanisms do 
not operate by directly treating individuals. Thus, in their 
relationship to the population the individual – the living 
person with a proper name – disappears into the life and 
mass of the population in the very process of making 
their statistical contribution to it. It is only the population 
– now as itself a subject for research and intervention – 
that serves as the target for the strategies and techniques 
that make up the security measure.   
From the standpoint of the security measure the 
concern with individuals is as cases, which are important 
only insofar as they manifest the features attributable to 
populations. From the standpoint of the population, the 
individual is a quantifiable vector for universal factors 
that bear the processes or characteristics of that feature of 
the population being examined. Thus, these newly 
emerging forms of medical rationality translate the 
individual into a case whose relationship is now 
conceived to be with the population taken as a whole. 
The case is not the individual person. The case is the 
individual conceived as a member of a population. As 
Foucault (2004) describes it:  
 
There is the appearance of this notion of case, which 
is not the individual case, but a way of 
individualizing the collective phenomena of the 
sickness, or of collectivizing it but as quantified, 
rational and identifiable. Collectivizing the 
phenomenon occurred by integrating individual 
phenomena within a collective field [d’intégrer à 
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l’intérieur d’un champ collectif les phénomènes 
individuels] (p. 62, my emphasis). 
 
Mainly through the deployment of statistical 
practices, the security measure is organized around 
mechanisms for translating a person’s characteristics and 
history into the range of variations exhibited by 
populations.  
 
V. The Case of Henrietta Lacks 
 
The distinction between disciplinary and security 
approaches to contagion continues to articulate the 
history of vaccine research and deployment through the 
late 20
th
 century. Following closely the details of that 
history suggests that new forms of organization have 
begun to develop where the fields of cell culture research 
and variology intersect with a rapidly expanding market 
in human tissues. These changes have grown so 
pronounced that it may now be possible to speak 
meaningfully of a kind of politics – or microbiopolitics – 
emerging disruptively within the circuits of power 
organizing populations and individual persons, one that 
takes place fundamentally at the level of cell functions 
themselves (Paxson, 2003, p. 18; Latour, 1988, pp. 90-
93). Rebecca Skloot’s book, The Immortal Life of 
Henrietta Lacks, is in large part a history of vaccination 
as a security measure in its ongoing tension with notions 
of personal identity founded on discourses involving civil 
rights that emphasize the importance of consent. The 
book relates the personal-historical narrative of Henrietta 
Lacks, who, as both an African-American and a woman, 
encountered a set of complex racial and gender-related 
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barriers in seeking access to effective medical treatment 
in the United States during the 1940s. However, Lacks is 
also the source of the HeLa cell line, and her tissues to 
this day sustain an entirely new industry and market in 
wildly diverse human products that range from the cell-
subjects necessary for effectively testing the first polio 
vaccine to the manufacture of victimless leather – the 
first leather-like jacket grown out of immortalized cell 
lines (Guertin, 2012, p. 25).  
The history Skloot tells involves two narratives that 
at times parallel each other, at others run counter, and at 
still others converge. Henrietta Lacks is important to this 
story in two ways: both as an legal individual whose 
tissues, having been used as a research subject and source 
of medical profit without her consent, have provoked 
multiple judicial interventions in an effort to adjudicate 
this rapidly forming, but legally ambiguous, area of the 
law; and as the source of the Hela cell line which, as the 
most viable cell line to date, has continued to serve as the 
subject of ongoing medical research for countless 
researchers in countless research labs worldwide for over 
sixty years. Henrietta Lacks continues to figure in this 
story in at least three ways: (1) as an individual at the 
center of civil rights litigation whose story continues to 
raise the issue of the importance of patient consent in the 
employment of human tissues for purposes of medical 
research; (2) as a case study important to the ongoing 
development of more effective techniques for making 
vaccine interventions at the level of populations; (3) and 
as patient 0 for a new human strain – the HeLa cell – 
whose highly distributed medical existence in labs 
worldwide has entirely eclipsed the importance of 
Lacks’s judicial and medical selves. Thus, at an 
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important point in the book, Skloot (2010, ch. 23) 
describes the task of researchers engaged in the project of 
reconstituting the genotype of Henrietta Lacks 25 years 
after her death from studies of the phenotypes of her 
descendants and the HeLa strain itself (Landecker, 2007, 
ch. 4). This retrieval of her genotypic identity was made 
necessary following discoveries in 1967 that the HeLa 
cell line had contaminated and overtaken nearly all other 
cell lines recognized at that time, invalidating or at least 
throwing into question thousands of studies in the field of 
cell culture research whose conclusions were based on 
the characteristics of these other cell lines. The 
importance of the difficulties this had, and still has, for 
researchers in that field cannot be overstressed. However, 
by relating this story, Skloot shows how these apparently 
distinct and different aspects of the same person – 
Henrietta Lacks as a historical person whose civil rights 
may have been violated by the actions of medical 
researchers and Lacks as a subject of science and source 
of the HeLa cell line – remain tightly linked even after 
her death.  
Much of Skloot’s story, in fact, is about the clash 
between Lacks’ descendants and the community of 
medical researchers grown dependent on an indefinite 
supply of HeLa for conducting research and synthesizing 
new therapies from it for profit. The core legal issue at 
stake in the clash between researchers and Lacks’ 
descendants concerns the requirement for the consent, 
and potential reimbursement, of patients on the part of 
researchers engaged in the task of developing therapies 
based on tissues harvested during routine medical 
procedures. Researchers argue that requiring patient 
consent before utilizing these tissues will act to inhibit 
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scientific developments. However, the increasing 
commercialization of tissues over the last century, and 
the patenting regime that has accompanied this process, 
has already inhibited scientific research from an entirely 
different and unexpected angle. Now the researchers, 
upholding their individual patents, have clearly become 
obstacles to scientific advancements. For instance, the 
1990 landmark case, Moore v Regents of the University 
of California, decided against John Moore whose spleen 
tissue had served to establish a new cell line subsequently 
patented by and profiting researchers without his 
knowledge. As Skloot (2010) quotes Lori Andrews, a 
lawyer working pro bono on most of the important 
biological ownership cases to date: 
 
It’s ironic…the Moore court’s concern was, if you 
give a person property rights, it would slow down 
research because people might withhold access for 
money. But the Moore decision backfired – it just 
handed that commercial value to researchers
 
(p. 324; 
also, chapters 13, 25 and Afterword). 
 
The decision of the Moore court effectively took 
patients out of the equation, and its later affirmation in 
Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital has emboldened 
scientists to commodify tissues in increasing numbers 
through the powerful allure of substantial profits (Evans, 
2006). Even the recent decision to include two members 
of the Lacks family on a committee to oversee N.I.H. 
funded research using HeLa only partially addresses the 
privacy and consent concerns involved in the Lacks case 
and does nothing to address the profit issues raised by the 
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market in human tissues in general or for HeLa in 
particular (Boffey, 2013).  
However, the legal battles over the contemporary 
commercialization of human biological materials are 
themselves entirely a consequence of the still relatively 
new notion of human genetic identity, conceived through 
the now routine capability researchers have for reliably 
individualizing the human somatic cell. This notion of 
genetic individuality is based on the simple historical fact 
that after 1948, and for the first time, the intact human 
body was not the only place for the large-scale generation 
of human cells (Landecker, 2007, ch. 4). The latter half 
of the twentieth century saw an explosion of 
developments in the field of cell culture research. These 
developments depended intimately on the perfection of 
techniques for cloning individual cells, the creation of 
standardized media for sustaining them, and the 
development of freezing techniques that made it possible 
to both store and easily transport somatic cells. The HeLa 
cell line was crucial to the development of each of these 
techniques. Moreover, this work allowed for the 
emergence of a notion of genetic identity for the human 
somatic cell rooted in clonal cell lines with distinct, 
heritable (and manipulable) characteristics. Cloning and 
freezing techniques made it possible to conceive of single 
somatic cells as individual entities in their own right and 
organized into ‘strains.’ Because cell lines were prone to 
change over the course of subsequent generations 
(Piotrowska, 2009, pp. 839-844), suspended animation 
techniques made it possible for the identity of individual 
strains to be stabilized through time by freezing samples 
from the first generation as a snapshot for comparison 
with successive ones (Landecker, 2007, ch. 4). This 
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means that the peculiar kind of immortality commonly 
ascribed to Henrietta Lacks both in the popular press but 
also among researchers simply due to the continued 
persistence of the HeLa cell line was theoretically a 
possibility open to anyone. A tissue sample taken from 
my body could now go on to have an independent and 
ongoing life as a biomedical subject, and it could do so 
indefinitely.  
However, with this new notion of genetic identity 
rooted in the individuality of the human somatic cell has 
something entirely new emerged yet again? Has the logic 
of the security mechanism Foucault describes, reliant as 
it is on the relationship between populations and the 
cases they manifest, effectively been displaced? It is 
important to remember that for Foucault the security 
mechanism is a response to the problems of governing 
populations. In his analyses the security mechanism is 
essentially linked with this specific kind of subject. But 
with these advances in cell culture technology and their 
connection to cloning and freezing techniques are we 
seeing here the emergence of a set of techniques and a 
field of inquiry rooted in both cell culture research and 
the market in human tissues in which we are no longer 
concerned with the life of populations composed of 
autonomous persons but a distinctly different kind of 
human existence that has recently acquired its own kind 
of autonomy? As Landecker (2007) makes this point: 
 
First through polio research, and then through the 
use of HeLa to figure out all kinds of tissue culture 
techniques, autonomously living human matter 
became widely used biomedical research material. 
More than that, it became possible for the first time 
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for one specimen, taken from one body, to be present 
simultaneously in thousands of laboratories and 
thousands of experiments as well as diachronically 
and repetitively across the lifetimes of the scientists 
themselves. The possibility of life being removed 
from the body and never returning to it was 
contained in this [Henrietta’s] story, an arrow that 
begins in the point of an individual person and 
continues without ever looping back. (Chapter 4)  
 
Landecker’s description of the practical 
consequences of late 20
th
 century developments in cell 
culture research points clearly in the direction of new 
structures of organization supporting and extending new, 
autonomous human strains with a new kind of human 
individuality defined through their distinguishable 
genetic identities.  
Genetic identity figures as essential to the notion of 
human identity that emerges here for researchers working 
with the latest clonal iteration of an established cell line 
stabilized through advanced cell culture techniques. But 
does this relatively new form of technically produced 
human existence have implications for the claims 
Foucault makes about the shifts that have occurred in 
modern forms of governance? Foucault (2004) describes 
security mechanisms at the time of their emergence as 
new deployments of power that continued to act together 
with and alongside already established judicial and 
disciplinary mechanisms (pp. 31-45 and pp. 233-253). 
However, he is also clear that distinct security measures 
like the worldwide market in grain, vaccine technology, 
and the structure of the modern police mark a clear and 
decisive break from these other forms of organization and 
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in fact come to circumscribe, penetrate, extend and 
displace these earlier modes where they continue to 
persist.  
Thus, during the 18
th
 century, a series of transitions 
in traditional notions accompanied the first deployments 
of security mechanisms. The very notion of the family 
transforms at this time from being a model of and an 
apology for sovereign government to that of an 
instrument for intervening in the characteristics and 
behaviors exhibited by populations (Foucault, 2004, pp. 
108-109). The progressive establishment of security 
mechanisms initiates a process where earlier forms of 
governance are circumscribed by newly emerging circuits 
of power. Even when judicial and disciplinary structures 
retain their place, they are effectively re-arranged, 
redeployed and rendered as different from their earlier 
functions as the 15
th
 century maréchaussée (Foucault, 
2004, pp. 343-344) differs from contemporary policing 
strategies for stopping gang violence. 
Twentieth century cell culture research, together 
with closely related fields, would seem to be causing a 
similar process of dislocation and re-orientation. 
However, if these changes are read through Foucault’s 
typology then these changes point to a process of 
reorganization occurring within the security mechanism 
of vaccine technology itself. They tend in the direction of 
kinds of organization that no longer rely on the 
population-case relationship. Given that this relationship 
is essential to the kinds of interventions security 
mechanisms perform, these new human strains emerging 
through the practices of late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century 
cell culture biology can no longer be assimilated entirely 
within the framework of security mechanisms as outlined 
MICROBIOPOLITICS 
 125 
by Foucault. And yet new forms of organization have 
emerged from the practices and techniques of cell culture 
research that routinely affect persons in a variety of ways. 
In fields as diverse as animal husbandry, crop 
development, law enforcement, tissue research and 
advanced health care the notion of genetic identity has 
long performed an organizational function. Further, the 
very legal conflict over who owns the rights to patents 
and profits arising from research into human tissues is 
itself the consequence of the way research and market 
forces have effectively organized the exploitation of 
these tissues for research and development. Human cell 
lines represent here a mode of existence defined entirely 
by the notion of genetic identity. They represent then a 
new mode of existence for human matter whose 
contemporary production often has no other purpose than 
to render them into small, entirely predictable, factories 
for generating specialized and exotic proteins or other 
synthesized molecules through feeding them precise diets 
of cell culture media. Clearly one would not think of 
attributing to this kind of human existence characteristics 
like self-awareness or consciousness. Nor could we speak 
of such research subjects as in any way engaged in 
‘technologies of the self’ but, as Landecker points out, 
researchers insist on maintaining a connection between 
the individual cell lines, no matter how altered, and the 
individual persons from whom they were taken. As 
Landecker (2007) argues: 
The importance of reciprocal identification of cell to 
person was in other words not merely fanciful. In the 
structure of reasoning behind the use of the cell line, 
there is an absolute necessity for a link between in vitro 
and in vivo life to be maintained; the information gleaned 
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from cells is useless unless it eventually is related back to 
the biology and then the pathology of the patient. 
Through the individual patient, the information then 
becomes applicable to humans in general. (ch. 4) 
Thus, the very rationale for using cells in place of 
the whole patient depends on maintaining a practical 
continuity between the individual person and the altered 
cell lines. This continuity between cell line and historical 
person – between, for instance, Hela and Henrietta Lacks 
– is crucial to supporting arguments made by researchers 
for the ongoing relevance of the discoveries of 
contemporary cell biology using cell line research to 
develop therapies for the general populations their lines 
of investigation are at least hypothesized to serve. If 
vaccine technology originated as a set of practices for 
intervening in the life of populations through indirect 
treatment of individual cases, then the relationship 
between population and case, so central to the logic of 
the security mechanism, has itself come to be mediated 
by this new, ambiguous relationship between historical 
persons and the cell lines developed from their tissues, 
cell lines which now serve as the experimental subjects 
for developing and testing both new vaccines but also a 
whole host of other biomedical products that often have 
only the most dubious utility for promoting the well-
being of persons.  
Thus, the question re-asserts itself here: in the 
emergence of this new kind of medical subject are we 
seeing the effect of a new kind of bio-political power that 
now intervenes within the juridical, disciplinary, and 
security frameworks Foucault describes? If the answer to 
this question is, ‘yes’, then the late 20
th
 century 
developments in cell biology form a new chapter in the 
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organization of power, the micro-biopolitical. These new 
organizational practices interrupt the logic of security 
mechanisms by mediating the relationship between 
populations and persons, breaking into the deployments 
of power organized by the practices and techniques of 
security mechanisms as these in turn were hypothesized 
by Foucault to have circumscribed the judicial and 
disciplinary structures of power that preceded them. A 
new kind of human identity emerged in cell biology after 
1950, one that currently is in the process of rearranging 
both security and disciplinary forms of organization. The 
field of cell biology maintains both a theoretical and 
practical dependence on the ambiguities involved in 
treating stable cell lines as in fact a (new) kind of human 
individual. Here, perhaps, bio-power has generated a new 
kind of human strain sustained by the peculiar matrix of 
theoretical-practical power peculiar to contemporary cell 
biology. If this is the case we can no longer claim, as did 
Foucault (1976), that despite the absolutizing trends of 
modern biopower for administering life, “it is not that life 
has been exhaustively integrated into these techniques 
which dominate and manage it; it ceaselessly escapes 
them” (p. 188). Rather, remaining with Foucault’s logic, 
with the progressive stabilization of this new kind of 
human individuality, we witness in fact a critical moment 
when techno-economic matrices have converged, 
emanating a mode of human existence with no subjective 
awareness whatsoever whose ‘life’ occurs only as object 
of research. Analysis of these new microbiopolitical 
structures clearly shows biological life to be still at the 
center of the process for modern extensions of power as 
was true, too, of security mechanisms. As Foucault 
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(1976) first described this process in one of his first 
formulations of the meaning of the biopolitical: 
 
If one can apply the term bio-history to the pressures 
through which the movements of life and the 
processes of history interfere with one another, one 
would have to speak of bio-power to designate what 
brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of 
explicit calculations and made knowledge-power 
[pouvoir-savoir] an agent of transformation of 
human life…modern man is an animal whose 
politics places his existence as a living being [sa vie 
d’être vivant] into question. (p. 188)  
 
This description would seem to be entirely 
applicable even if the logic of power has changed. The 
logic of the security mechanism described by Foucault 
still aimed at promoting human well-being if only in the 
form of the health of the population and the progressive 
promotion of its ‘normal’ trend-lines. These new 
microbiopolitical structures identified here actively 
support and generate a new kind of genetic individuality 
based on the conception of human existence as a kind of 
infinitely manipulable matter in the aggressive pursuit of 
ends that may well be entirely detached from any notion 
of human well-being.  
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